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UNITED STATES SENATE 

FUNDAMENTAL PEACE IDEAS 

including 

m WESTPHALIAN PEACE TREATY 

(1 648) 

and 



1 

(19 19) 

in connection with 



International Psyckkgy and Revolutions 



By ARTHUR MAC DONALD 

Anthropologist : Washington, D. C 



(Reprinted from the Congressional Record July 1, 1919, 
United States Senate) 




125746—19572 



WASHINGTON 
1919 




Gift 



•Vl3 



The Westphalian Peace Treaty (1648) and the League of 
Nations (1919) in Connection With International Psy- 
chology and Revolutions. 



BY ARTHUR MAC DONALD, 

Anthropologist, Washington, D. C, and Honorary President 

of the International Congress of Criminal 

Anthropology of EuroiJe. 



INTRODUCTION. 

The League of Nations may only be a first step in the direction of 
permanent peace, yet not a few persons seem doubtful of its utility. 
However, the league may be the lesser evil as compared with the old 
regime, which appears to have resulted in total failure after a very long 
and fair trial. 

Whatever be the ultimate outcome of the league and of the problems 
to be solved, the one encouraging thing is that all the people are thinking 
seriously on the subject and longing for some way to stop war. It may 
be true that lasting peace can only be secured when both people and 
leaders (sometimes the people lead the leaders) realize the necessity of 
peace and the senselessness of war. But to reach such a happy realiza- 
tion of the truth what are we, the people, to do now? Already the dis- 
cussions of the league (pro and con) have fertilized the soil; the minds 
of the people are open as never before ; and now is the supreme moniout 
to sow peace seeds. The sooner, more thoroughly, and wider they are 
scattered, the better. In this way we may be able to so impress peace 
ideas upon everyone, as to avoid the terrible necessity of a future war. In 
which both sides become exhausted, as in the Thirty Years' War, which 
would be a much more horrible war than the present war. 

To escape such a catastrophe and make a league of nations or an\ 
kind of peace arrangements endure is preeminently an educational 
problem, and consists mainly in repeatedly filling the minds of the 
people, old and young, everywhere with fundamental peace conceptions. 
Shall we not begin at once and persist in doing this until political wars 
become as impossible in the future as religious wars are now? 

SUGGESTIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY OF WE.STPHALIA FOR THE LEAGUE OF 

NATIONS. 1 

The conference of nations that has taken place around the peace 
table at Paris is doubtless the most important of any in history. One 
reason is the fact that the plan the conference has decided to carry out 
will necessarily concern most all countries of the world. For railroads, 
steamships, aeroplanes, telegraphs, telephones, and wireless telegraphy, 
as never before, have made communication between nations so easy, 
quick, and direct that distance is almost eliminated, enabling the whole 
world to think, reason, and act at the same time, and to be influenced as 
one human solidarity. 

There seems to be a strong desire in all lands that the peace con- 
ference will make future wars not only improbable but practically 
impossible. But how can this be done? For years countless peace 
plans and theories have been proposed filling volumes of books, but 
they are mainly of a speculative nature. Since theoretical grounds 
have proved inadequate, is there then any experience in the history 
of the world which can be made a basis for permanent peace? Is there, 
for instance, any kind of war that has resulted in doing away with 
itself permanently? The answer would point to the Thirty Years' War, 
closing with the "peace of Westphalia (1648), which seems to have put 
an end to all religious wars. 

How, then, does it happen that the peace treaty of Westphalia, of 
all the treaties in the world, is the only one that has succeeded in 

1 Article (by writer) in Central Law Journal, St. Louis, April 25, 
1919, and in Open Court, April, 1919, Chicago, 111. 

12574(5—19572 3 



• 4 

stopping all religious wars? We are certainly dealing here with a 
phenomenal fact in history. The writer has been unable to find any 
discussion of this phase of the matter. It would therefore seem of in- 
terest and importance, especially at the present time, to make a brief 
anthropological study of the Thirty Years' War which led to such an 
exceptional and successful treaty. 

NEW FIELD FOR ANTHROPOLOGY. 

From the anthropological point of view, history can be looked upon 
as a vast laboratory for the purpose of studying humanity and assisting 
in its progress. In the past antiiropology has concerned itself mainly 
with savage and prehistoric man, but it is due time that it take up the 
more important and much more diffior.lt subject of civilized man, not 
only as an individual but as an organization ' or nation, or group of 
nations. It is true that other departments of knowledge, such as his- 
tory and political science, have pursued these fields, but unfortunately 
not always in the scientific sense ; to use an ancient pun, it is his story, 
rather than all the facts. Anthropology in this new field should seek 
to establish only those truths which can be based upon facts. There 
are doubtless many very important truths which can not be established 
by scientific methods, but perhaps they can "be better treated in political 
science, psychology, ethics, philosophy, and theology. 

In the present inquiry the anthropological problem is this : As re- 
ligious wars are admitted to be the most intense, most idealistic, and 
most sacrificial of all wars, and therefore most diflicult to stop, can it 
be ascertained just how the Thirty Years' War, culminating in the 
peace of Westphalia, brought about the end of all religious wars? This 
might suggest how all political wars may be made to cease. If the 
seventeenth century accomplished the more difficult task, the peace 
conference at Paris ought to succeed in the less difficult one. If the 
twentieth century prides itself •in being superior in diplomacy, prac- 
tical statesmanship, and general mental caliber, it will now have an 
opportunity to show such superiority by formulating a treaty which 
will make all future political wars not only improbable but impossible. 

PRINCIPLES OF A PEACE CONFERENCE. 

In following the present peace conference and comparing it with the 
peace congress of Westphalia, it may be well to mention a few of the 
principles of such congresses in general. In a treaty of peace there are 
first of all the usual articles, as, e. g., a declaration that peace is 
restored and amnesty clauses, including restitution of such conquests 
as are not intended to be retained, and of rights suspended by the war. 
Also there are provisions to remove the causes out of which the war 
arose, redress grievances, and prevent their recurrence. This is the 
most essential thing for the congress to do. Then there is the indem- 
nity article to make satisfactory reparation for injury sustained and 
cost of war. But great prudence should be exercised here, otherwise 
the conquered power may feel deep resentment which is liable to sow 
seeds for a future war. 

As to personal attendance at the congress, one great advantage is 
that difficulties thought insurmountable in correspondence often disap- 
pear in an interview. Half the work is done when members have come 
to know what each really wants. But in long discussions there is 
danger of becoming fatigued and making ill-advised concessions. There 
is also temptation for some members to interfere where they have no 
substantial interests nor rights, and to contract engagements in which 
they have no special concern. When strong enough, every nation will 
insist on the right to manage its own internal affairs. Sometimes there 
are a few particularly able men, speaking .■several languages fluently (a 
very practical advantage), but representing only small countries, who 
may exercise undue influence and cause the congress to authorize things 
which may not prove of equal justice to all. Members of congresses 
have been known to vote for things that they did not understand, to 
the great disadvantage of their own country, due mainly to inexperience 
and lack of familiarity with the language spoken in the congress. 

THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA. 

As early as 1636 Pope Urban VIII extorted from the powers engaged 
in the Thirty Years' War their unwilling consent to treat. In 1637 a 
discussion of safe conducts was begun, which lasted nearly five vcars, 
and it was not until 1641 that preliminaries as to time andplace of the 
congress were signed, and these were not ratified, nor safe conducts 



' See a study of the United States Senate by the writer (published in 
Spanish) under the title " Estudio del Senado de los Estados Unidos de 
America." in Revista Argentina de Ciencias Politicas, 12 de Enero de 
1G18. (Buenos Ayres, 1918.) 
125746—19572 



exchangecl, until 1643, making six years for controversies as to mere 
fornialitios. One of tlie causes of this dilatoriness was that neither 
side really desired peace. Captiousness and punctiliousness were doubt- 
less emphasized in order to obtain delay. The labor of concluding 
peace was colossal ; there were endless obstacles to surmount, contend- 
ing interests to reconcile, a labyrinth of circumstances to cope with, 
difficulties to overcome besetting the congress from the very outset of 
the negotiations, not only of arranging the conditions of peace but still 
more of carrying them through the proceedings. 

It is therefore fair to assume that the difficulties in establishing the 
Peace of Westphalia were as great as, and probably greater than, 
those now confronting the peace conference at Paris. For in the 
Westphalian congress nobody desired peace, and it was not possible to 
agree* to an armistice, so that war continued while the congress was 
in session, materially affecting the deliberations ; this may be one 
reason why the congress lasted as long as four years. 

To avoid questions of precedence and to lessen further opportunities 
for disagreement, two cities in Westphalia, Munster for the Catholics 
and Osnnbruck for the Protestants, were selected. These places were 
a short day's ride apart. The treaty was signed at Munster October 
24. 1648, and was called " The Peace of Westphalia." In addition to 
the disposition for delay, there was a tendency to criticize things 
generally. Thus certain' plenipotentiaries complained of tbeir accom- 
modations, saying that the houses assigned to tbem, though high and 
handsome externally, were in fact rat holes. The streets also were 
pronounced very narrow, so much so that when a certain very polite 
diplomat, who wore a very large hat, made from his coach an ex- 
tremely low bow, his hat hit a very expensive vase in an open window, 
which fell and broke, causing great embarrassment. 

First, questions of etiquette were taken up. For instance, did the 
precedence belong to Spain, and what marks of honor were due to the 
representatives of the neutral powers? Then came contests for the 
ecclesiastical seats. The Nuncio, the representative of the Pope, 
wished to sit not only at the head of the table but wanted a canopy 
over him to distinguish him. The way in which the minor powers 
should be received was in doubt. It was finally decided to go half- 
way down the stairs with guests when departing. Also the question 
of titles arose. The word " excellency " was chosen for addressing 
the envoys of the great powers, but it had to be extended to the lesser 
powers. The Venetian envoy obtained the honor (to his joy) of being 
conducted, when he visited the French plenipotentiary, to the door of 
his coach, instead of to the staircase. These few of the many inci- 
dents during the congress will illustrate the human side of official 
matters. Such disputes as to precedence and etiquette were to be 
expected in a proud and ceremonious age among representatives of 
numerous States, especially when many of them were of doubtful rank. 
There was also much display. A train of 18 coaches conveyed the 
French envoys in their visits of ceremony. It appeared that France 
desired to show that she had not been impoverished by the war like 
Germany. 

The papal nuncio and the Venetian envoy were mediators as well 
as members of the congress. France and Sweden were opposed to 
each other in religion, but in accord on political matters. The treaty 
was drawn up with such fullness and precision of language as is rarely 
found in documents of this nature, due to a large body of trained 
lawyers among the members. As indicating a desire for fairness in 
little things as well as in larger questions, the treaty contained these 
words : " No one of any party shall look askance at anyone on account 
of his creed." As an example of wise provisions, the following may be 
noted : The Protestants demanded the year 1618 as annus normalis 
for the restitution of ecclesiastical estates, the Catholics insisted on 
the year 1630, which was much more favorable to them. The con- 
gres.s split the difference and made it 1624. The medius tei'minus 
is often the wi.sest course in acute controversies. As to temporal af- 
fairs, all hostilities of whatever kind were to be forgotten, neither 
party being allowed to molest or injure the other for any purpose. In 
recrard to spiritual affairs, complete equality was to exist (aequalitas 
exacta mutuaque), and every kind of violence was forever forbidden 
between the parties. 

The peace of Westphalia was the first effort to reconstruct the Euro- 
pean states' system, and it became the common law of Europe. Few 
treaties have had such influence, and Europe is said for the first time 
to have formed a kind of commonwealth watching with anxiety over 
the preservation of the general peace. 

THE Thirty ye.\rs' w.\r. 

To have called to mind some of the principal points in the peace 
of Westphalia is not sufficient for understanding the real significance 
125746—19572 



of the treaty without some consideration of the war which it closed. 
As already suggested, this war, looked at from a scientific point of 
view, is au unconscious experiment of nations, an attempt to solve a 
problem ifl abnormal international psychology. In order to comprehend 
this experiment and its resultant treaty, just how it brought about 
permanent religious peace, some of the main events of the war must 
be recalled as a basis upon which to work. 

The Protestant Reformation had great influence upon almost every- 
thing political in Europe, until the peace of Westphalia. The religious 
peace of Augsburg (155.5) furnished no settlement to questions stirred 
up by the Reformation. It was inevitable that such fundamental disa- 
greements should lead to a general war. The Thirty Years' War 
marked the end of the Reformation, which changed the idea of Chris- 
tian unity and altered the theory of a holy Roman empire, replacing 
it by the idea of autonomy for individual states. 

On May 23. 1618, a body of Protesfants entered the royal palace at 
Prague and threw two detested representatives of the Crown from the 
window. This act started a struggle that for 30 years involved Europe 
in a war which spread gradually from Bohemia over southern Germany, 
then slowly to northern Germany and Denmark, until country after 
country began to take part and the fighting became general. The war 
might have ended in 1623, making it a five years' war, had it not been 
for the outrageous treatment of the Protestant states of northern Ger- 
many, resulting in a political disintegration in which Germany lost 
half of her population and two-thirds of her wealth. Her religion and 
morality sank low, and the intellectual damage required generations to 
restore. 

The Roman Catholic Church, having guided Christianity for centuries 
without a rival, naturally felt greatly wronged by Protestant secession. 
This explains the uncompromising enmities of the Thirty Years' War. 
Various parties claimed the control of the religious doctrines to be 
taught the people, as well as control of worship ; they were fighting 
each other for this power, ready to sacrifice their lives for it. The 
Lutherans were as intolerant toward the Calvanists as they were to- 
ward the Catholics. The Catholic Church, convinced of the absolute 
truth of its doctrines based upon 13 centuries of growth, naturally 
could not tolerate some young reformers to arise and challenge its di- 
vine right, especially not since these reformers seized old monastic and 
ecclesiastic foundations with domains and edifices and administered 
them in their own interest. The resistance of the Catholic hierarchy, 
to the last drop of blood, was a normal reaction. As so often happens, 
the conditions were abnormal, not the human beings. 

Had the war stopped in 1623 the Catholics would have been left with 
decided advantages. Their own ambitions, however, prevented it. Gus- 
tavus Adolphus appeared, and by his efforts Protestantism is said to 
have been saved from extinction. During 13 of the 30 years the lands 
of the Protestants had been devastated ; during the next 17 years an 
equalization of the exhaustion of the parties developed before a lasting 
religious peace was made. It became clear in the end that neither 
Catholics nor Protestants could crush their opponents without perishing 
likewise. 

TERRIBLE RESULTS OF THE WAR. 

The terrible results of the Thirty Years' War may be summed up by 
saying that Germany was the carcass, and the hosts which invaded the 
German soil were the vultures. The Protestant invaders were Swedes, 
Finns, Hollanders, Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Scotchmen ; on the 
Catholic side there came in Spaniards, Italians, Walloons, Poles, Cos- 
sacks, Croats, and representatives of nearly all other Slavonic tribes. 
There was an army never larger than 40,000 men, but the camp follow- 
ers were 140,000, consisting of gangs of Gypsies, Jewish camp traders, 
marauders, and plunderers. The soldiers robbed and tortured all alike, 
both friend and foe. The inhabitants would flee to the woods, taking 
with them or hiding everything they could. But the invaders were ex- 
perts in discovering secret treasures ; they would pour water on the 
ground, and where it sank quickly there they knew something had been 
recently buried. 

To retaliate, the peasants would watch for stragglers, for the sick 
and wounded who had dropped behind, putting, them to death with 
every device of insult and cruelty known. Much of the cruelty is too 
hideous to mention. In many districts the desolation was so great that 
persons were found dead with grass in their mouths. Men climbed up 
the scafiEolds and tore down the bodies of those hanged and devoured 
them. The supply was large. Newly buried corpses were dug up for 
food. Children were enticed away that they might be slain and eaten. 
The population, when plundered, would become plunderers in turn, 
forming into bands, and inflict on others the Iiorrors that they them- 
selves had suffered. Men became wholly indifferent to the sufi:erings 
125746—19572 



of others. Whole countries were destroyed, towns and villages reduced 
to ashes, and civilization was pushed back into barbarism for half a 
century. The Thirty Years' War is said to have been so unspeakably 
cruel and calamitous that the like has never been known in Europe. 

CAUSES OF THE LENGTH OF THE WAR. 

Gustavus Adolphus writes in a letter that the war would be long 
drawn out and stop from exhaustion. The original purpose of the war 
was the suppression of the Protestant faith, but the victories of Gus- 
tavus Adolphus made the Catholics hopeless. Also other interests of a 
political nature rose up, the war passed from a German to a European 
question. Though there were times when peace might have been made, 
the side who had the best of it for the moment deemed it folly to stop 
when victory was in reach. The other side thought it base and cow- 
ardly not to continue, as some turn of fortune might repair the losses. 
Many a war has dragged on after the purpose for which it began had 
become unattainable, because those who began it were too vain to 
admit that the objects of the war were impossible from its outset. 

In a long war also individuals rise up to whom fighting becomes a 
second nature, who know nothing else but violence and murder. Thus 
many soldiers were indignant when the Westphalian peace was signed, 
for they felt they had a vested right to plunder and murder, looking 
upon a wretched, helpless population as their just prey. 

A further reason for the long continuation of the war was the very 
exhaustion of both sides ; there was not enough strength on either 
side to strike a decisive blow, nor sufficient energy left to make a 
vigorous effort for peace, making it seem useless to try. In the earlier 
and middle period of the war there were many cries for peace, but in 
the last eight years there was a terrible silence of death and such utter 
desperation that no one dared to speak of peace, so great was the 
exhaustion. The soldiers decreased as it became more and more diffi- 
cult to recruit and feed them ; the military operations grew feebler 
and more desultory, the fighting more inconclusive, though the misery 
did not diminish. But while the people and soldiers had become tired 
of the interminable struggle and wanted peace, many of the diplomats 
did not appear to desire it. 

CAUSES OF THE WAR. 

The great length of the war gradually revealed its very hopelessness 
and uselessness, creating a general desire for rest and peace, transform- 
ing and weakening the religious movements out of which the war had 
arisen. The principle of private judgment, coming from the Reforma- 
tion, had had time to develop and undermine the ideas of temporal rights 
and duties common to both parties, while many ideas first conceived by 
the Reformation but <^uppr( sed at the time, had at last commenced to 
grow through the long-continued turbulations. 

Another cause of the war was the inherent incompatibility of religious 
views among the people. Religious discord exists to-day. but it is not 
decided by bloody contests, because of breadth of religious insight, gen- 
eral indifference, and increasing skepticism. The convictions of the 
people of the seventeenth centry, as to the truth of their own opinions 
and the errors of their opponents, were of such an absolute character 
as can not be found nowadays even among people with the most rigid 
beliefs. They did not know then that it was possible to live together 
and yet have the most varied and contradictory religious convictions. 
To suppose that these people were stupid is an error. The chances are 
that they were less stupid than the people are to-day. How many, at 
the present time, can look at their country, its ideals, ideas, and customs 
justly and wtihout prejudice? Naturally very few. But to place our- 
selves outside of not only our country but our generation is much more 
difficult. How could we then expect the people of the seventeenth 
century to do this? 

IGNORANCE THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF THE WAR. 

The fundamental cause that brought the Thirty Years' War to a close 
was mental insight into the uselessness and hopelessness of further 
struggle, caused by the feeling of exhaustion due to the long continuance 
of the war. The reason why this war put an end to all religious wars 
was, that this intellectual insight became general in Europe, inculcating 
more liberal religious views. This psychological attitude, with increas- 
ing indifference to religion and resultant skepticism, caused religious 
questions to be regarded less seriously, making further wars for such pur- 
poses impossible. The basal reason, therefore, was the intellectual 
realization of the foolishness of bloodshed on account of difference of 
religious convictions ; that is, lack of knowledge of this fact in the past — 
in short, ignorance — was at the bottom of it all, as of most evils in the 
world. 

125746—19572 



8 

COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE THIUTY YEARS' WAR AND IHE EUROPEAN 

WAR. 

In order to learn what suggestions from the Thirty Years' War may 
be of use for the League of Nations in the future it will be well to men- 
tion the general similarities and difEerences between this war and the 
recfnt European war. 

The similarities are as follows : 

1. The Thirty Years' War began with the throwing out of a window 
(defenstration) of detested persons; the European war started from an 
assassination. 

2. The Thirty Years' War had been expected for some time ; a general 
European war had been predicted for many years. 

3. The Thirty Years' War, beginning with a local incident, spread 
from country to country, .iust lii^e the European war did. 

4. The Thirty Years' War was exceedingly brutal for its generation, 
just as the European war has been for our time. 

5. The Thirty Years' War was a very long one for its generation ; 
the European w'ar has been a relatively long one for recent times. 

As to the differences between the two wars, it may be said that — 

1. In the Thirty Years' War both belligerents finally proved to be 
nearly equal in strength. In the European war one of the belligerents, 
though at first meeting with reverses, in the end completely overcame 
the other. 

2. The Thirty Years' War ended in the exhaustion of both belliger- 
ents ; the European war closed with the exhaustion of only one bel- 
ligerent. 

3. The Thirty Years" War was waged for religious convictions rather 
than for gain ; the European war was not so ideal in its purposes. 

Taljing a general view of the similarities and differences between 
the two wars, the one great question arises: Is the experience of the 
present European war strong enough for victors and vanquished alike 
to be willing to yield sufficient of their natural rights and sovereignty 
to submit all questions of war to some superior international court 
from which there is no appeal? 

In the Thirty Years' War nothing further was necessary ; the exhaus- 
tion of both belligerents was sufficient to end religious wars. 

. As the victorious party in war is much less inclined (if inclined at 
all) than the conquered foe to yield anything, will the Allies, without 
the experience of defeat and exhaustion, be willing to yield enough of 
their sovereignty to make the future peace of the world permanent? 
Will they be magnanimous and give up some national advantages of the 
present "for future international benefits to all mankind? In short, are 
they unselfish enough to so temper their justice witli mercy as to estab- 
lish a world peace, the greatest boon to humanity ever known? 

Here is a supreme opportunity. Will the victorious Allies arise to 
the occasion and make future wars Improbable, if not impossible? We 
say " impossible,'' because if a nation is recalcitrant it can be punished 
by a general boycott, leading toward its economic ruin. As the instinct 
of self-preservation is the most powerful influence in nations as well 
as in individuals, it is a moral certainty that no nation could or would 
submit very long to such punishment. Just after a war is ended, 
when the belligerents feel more keenly its effect than later on, they 
are much more disposed to make mutual concessions. Will the victors 
of the European War strike at once while the iron is hot, and insist 
on the one paramount issue, the absolute prohibition of all wars? Such 
a decision would radiate through all further proceedings of the League 
of Nations and greatly facilitate its work. By thus making a certainty 
of the most important question of all history, no matter how difficult 
and delicate matters of greater or less importance may be, the League of 
Nations will have assured its success in advance as the greatest and 
most beneficent influence that the world has ever experienced, just as the 
peace of Westphalia was in its generation. 

In the peace treaty of Westphalia were these words : " The hostilities 
that have taken place from the beginning of the late disturbances, in 
any place of whatsoever kind, by one side or the other, shall be for- 
gotten and forgiven, so that neither party shall cherish enmity or 
hatred against, nor molest nor injure the other for any cause what- 
soever." Will the peace treaty of Paris contain as generous and noble 
words and stop all political wars forever, just as the peace of West- 
phalia put an end to all religious wars? 

Will the twentieth century Christianity, with its supposed greater 
liberality and enlightenment, be as far-seeing, unselfish, and effective 
as the Christianity of the seventeenth century? 

Let the League of Nations answer yes. 

Just as the spread of education and knowledge has gradually liberated 
the intellect so as to undermine the ideas upon which religious wars were 
125746 — 19572 



based, so a similar process of enlightenment may be necessary to cause 
poUtical wars to ce?se. 

REFERENCES. 

The following references are only a few of those easily accessible In 
/ibraries. The Cambridge Modern History (vol. 4) has a bibliography of 
some 3,000 works and brochures on the Thirty Years' War. 

Bougeant. Histoire des Guerres et des N^gociations qui prec6derent 
le Traits de Westphalie. Paris, 1751. 

Bernard, Mountague. Four lectures in subjects connected with diplo- 
macy. J^ondon, 1868, 8°. Lecture 1 is entitled " The Congress of West- 
phalia " (60 pp.) ; comparison with other congresses is made. 

The Cambridge Modern History. The Thirty Years' War, Volume IV. 
Cambridge, 1906, III, 1,003 pages. It contains a most extensive classi- 
fied bibliography of the war, filling 150 pages. 

Freytag, Gustav. Bilder aus der Deutschen Vergangenheit. Includes 
chapters on Thirty Years' War. 

(jindely, Anton. History of the Thirty Years' War. 2 volumes. New 
York, 1884. 

Hausser, Ludwig. The period of the Reformation, 1517 to 1648 
(translation). London, 1873, 8°, 456 pages. 

Cust, Edward. Lives of the warriors of the Thirty Years' War. 2 vol- 
umes, 12°. London, 1865. The author is a military man. 

Leclerc. N^gociations s^crfetes touchant la Paix de Muenster et d'Os- 
nabrug. 

Puetter. Geist des Westphalischen Friedens. 

International Psychology and Peace.* 
The history of the world would seem to indicate that international 
psychology is almost synonymous with international anarchy. For the 
last 30 or more years, as is well known, a general European war was 
expected, predicted, and feared. This was the abnormal psychological 
condition of diplomatic and military Europe until the present war 
caused its realization. The world appears always to have existed in 
a pathological condition of possible, probable, or actual war. The ques- 
tion is. " Shall the world continue in this old way of international 
anarchism and political pathology, or shall it make a supreme effort to 
shake off this monstrous incubus of war? " 

It is a peculiar circumstance that, while anarchism within a nation 
is generally detested, anarchism between nations has been palatable so 
long. Cannibalism existed for thousands of years, slavery also, yet 
both have been practically abandoned, and now there seems to be a 
chance to do away with the last and greatest enemy of humanity — 
war. To stop an evil that has existed so long and whose roots reach 
back into the beginning of history will necessarily require colossal effort 
and great sacrifice. Such an effort has been successful only once in 
the history of the world. That was when the Westphalian peace treaty 
was signed, in 1648, after the Thirty Years- War.^ This resulted in 
abolishing the most difficult kind of wars — religious wars. If the seven- 
teenth century could accomplish this greater task, certainly the twen- 
tieth century should take courage and likewise put an end to political 
wars, the lesser task. It may not be possible to make war impossible, 
but this is no reason it should not be tried. It may be possible, however, 
to make war most improbable. 

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN HISTORY NECESSARY. 

In the writing of history a common illusion Is to exaggerate the 
future importance of contemporary events. Both sides in the French 
Revolution thought that the end of the world had come, as no doubt it 
had for some. Comparatively few men can get outside of their coun- 
try and look at things as they are, but very few or none can separate 
themselves from their generation and look without prejudice into the 
future. The importance of every great event is usually exaggerated by 
those immediately interested. From the historical point of view, the 
degree of importance of current events can not be determined until 
some time afterwards when the sources are more accessible, and it is 
possible to consider them calmly, and from the point of view of strict 
truth, which is one of the main principles of scientific inquiry. His- 
tory is continuous and not broken up by what the present generation 
may think to be a finality or cataclysm ; there may be progress or re- 

1 Article (by writer) in Chicago Legal News for May 8, 1919. 

^ See article (by author) entitled " Suggestions from the Westphalian 
Peace Treaty for the Peace Conference in France," published in the 
Journal of Education, Boston, March 27, 1919, and Central Law Jour- 
nal. St. Louis, Mo., April, 1919 ; also in Open Court for April, 1919, 
Chicago. 

125746 — 19572 



w 

trosression, but neither Is so great as they appear at the time of the 
events which cause enthusiasm and optimism in the victorious and 
despair and pessimism in the vanquished. These are temporary phe- 
nomena, being only links in the historical chain. The changes after 
this war back to normal conditions may be much greater and faster 
than in previous wars. In this connection it must be remembered that 
tiie humane spirit is now much more diffused in the world than in the 
past, which is indicated by the enormous extent of protests against the 
horrors of war.^ These horrors are common to all wars and were rela- 
tively as frequent in the past, if not more so. It is true that the absolute 
number of outrages may have been much greater in the present war than 
in previous wars, but this is probably due mainly to the enormous num- 
ber of individuals engaged in the war. 

I.NTEKDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS A DEMOGRAPHIC LAW. 

The world has become so closely connected through modern means of 
communication that any war might result in a world war. The preva- 
lent political tendencies are in the direction of combination and result- 
ant consolidation. The question soon arises. Shall combination and 
regulation go beyond national limits? The old-fashioned ideas of na- 
tional limits do not seem to be adapted to present conditions. Commer- 
ciallv such limits are impracticable and appear to be so in other ways.* 
The "Constitution of the United States has 18 amendments. This demo- 
graphic law of interdependence of nations necessarily results in combi- 
nation, which eventually may lead to international solidarity. 

Whether we will or "no, this demographic law of interdependence of 
nations can not be escaped. Just as the States of the Union are now 
closer together than their counties were many years ago, through the 
enormous development of physical moans of communication, so gov- 
ernments are now brought more closely in contact than were the States 
at the time of the formation of the Union. This demographic law of in- 
creasing interdependence when carefully examined appears to be almost 
as necessary as the law of gravity. It has been at work ever since his- 
tory began and, though little noticed perhaps, it has been manifesting 
Itself more and more as history advanced. The individual is subor- 
dinate to the community and must yield some of his sovereignty to It, 
the community in turn must yield to the county, the county to the 
Plate, the State to the Nation, and finally the Nation to the world. 
This last step is the one now pending in Europe, and eventually, if not 
presently, may result in International solidarity, which will practically 
put an end to political wars just as the Westphalian peace did with re- 
ligious war's. 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC LAW OF INTKRDH- 
PENDENCE OP STATES. 

The tendency toward this demographic law of interdependence of 
States is shown by the large number of international organizations 
such as congresses or conference'? which are held from time to time in 
different countries of the world. From the Conference of Vienna (1815) 
to the present time there have been some two hundred or more inter- 
national congresses, the majority of which had to do with regulation 
of oconomir and sociologic affairs. Thus manufacturers, merchants, 
and capitalists of different countries have met and made agreements to 
control and regulate production and distribution of merchandise. 

There is also the Universal Postal Union, which is an illustration of 
International control or government. Objections are sometimes made 
against international government, which were made years ago against 
the International Postal Union. It now has a constitution obeyed by 
all nations. Refusal to obey would deprive a country of the benefits 
of the union. As a matter of fact, no country has done this. 

POWER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

If there were an international organization for war as well as for 
postage, and one or two nations should refuse to obey the decisions of 
a majority, or three-fourths of the organization, each of these recalci- 
trant nations could be boycotted economically and in many other ways 
by the remaining member nations. It is very doubtful if any nation 
would take such chances. 

Any international organization helps toward peace by making action 
less precipitate, for if it were known in advance that a conference were 

' See article (by author) in Pacific Medical Journal, San Francisco, 
Calif., April, 1916, entitled "Atrocities and Outrages of War " : also 
pamphlet (by author) entitled " War and Criminal Anthropology," re- 

?rinted from the Congressional Record for February 17 and March 15, 
917. Washington, D. C. 
' Woolf, L. S., International Government, Fabian Research Depart- 
ment, London. 

125746—19572 



11 

to take place, this wonlrt tond to make nations less disposed to go to 
war. In fact, all international conferences, like the International Con- 
gress of Criminal Anthroijology, tend to intellectual, moral, and socio- 
logical solidarity between nations, in accordance with our demographic 
law of interdependence. (See Equation of law later on.) This Interna- 
tional Congress of Criminal Anthropology, for instance, consists of some 
four hundred university specialists in anthropology, medicine, psychol- 
ogy, and sociology, who come from almost all countries of the world. 

In the eighteenth century international relations consisted of diplo- 
matic conversations and were regulated by an occasional treaty, but, 
owing to the very inadequate means of communication, few interna- 
tional relations were required. In the nineteenth century the change 
in international conditions was very great. When international or- 
ganizations represent some actual phase of life, whether educational, 
commercial or scientific, they really regulate their relations between 
nations and are often organs of international government. In short, 
international conferences and congresses act like legislatures between 
nations. 

If conferences had been in vogue and one had been held concerning 
the dispute between Austria and Serbia, very probably there would not 
have been any war, because, if for no other reason, the diplomats 
would have seen that it might lead to a general war in Europe, and 
as no nation cared to take that responsibility the diplomatic pro- 
cedure would doubtless have been modified. Thus the conference over 
the Morocco question killed it as a cause of war. 

This and other practical examples of government between nations 
show that the great success, convenience, and benefit to all nations 
encourage the further development of international organizations. The 
difficulties and dangers predicted have not come to pass. International 
administration has come in the ca.scs of railroads, ships, and auto- 
mobiles. An elaborate international government has come (through 
treaties) in public health and epidemics, and international notification 
of the presence of disease has been made obligatory. 

SOVEREIGNTY DECREASES ACCORDING TO THE DEMOGRAPHIC LAW OF 
INTERDEPENDENCE OP NATIONS. 

The old idea of the independence of the State, mingled with that of 
sovereignty, prestige, and honor, and exaggerated by false patriotism, 
although limited more and more by conditions of civilization, is one of 
the main obstacles to the development of international organization and 
government. 

The habit of holding conferences or congresses would get the people 
to expect international government and insist on it, and any country 
would hesitate long before refusing to agree to a conference. 

The idea that sovereignty is destroyed because a nation Is not 
absolutely independent belongs to the old regime, when many modern 
means of communication did not exist. In those days of comparative 
isolation there was reason for much independence, but now countries 
are so closely connected, as we have seen, that their independence and 
sovereignty are necessarily limited, while their interdependence has in- 
creased to such an extent that what benefits or injures one benefits or 
injures the other. Thus it is to the advantage of each State to give 
up some of its sovereignty, just as it is for the individual to give up 
some of his freedom to the community for privileges much greater 
than the loss of his so-called independence. It is well known how the 
States of our Union have gradually yielded more and more of their 
sovereignty to the Federal Government. Thus sovereignty decreases 
according to our law of the interdependence of States. 

CAUSE OF, WAR NOT NECESSARILY ECONOMIC. 

It is frequently asserted that after all the main caase of most wars 
is rivalry in trade and commercial friction ; in short, IL is economic. 
But it is a curious fact that commerce and industry are the most in- 
sistent on international rules or law to reduce all friction to a mini- 
mum, for peaceful trading is a general beaeflt lo all concerned. 

It might be stated in this connection that i.a historical and political 
as well as physical science there is no one cause of anything, but a 
chain of causes : for the more we study the world, the closer we llnd 
it related ; nothing is nor can be really alone. When we single out 
a cause we mean the predominant on?, and which is the strongest link 
in the chain of causes becomes a matter of opinion, owing to our limited 
knowledge of Internationa! psychoicgy. 

Commercial systems of the world have brought nations closer together, 
but political relations have remained much the same ; that is, the ad- 
vances in diplomacy have been very few in comparison with the growth 
of economic relations which makes for peace rather than war. 
125746 — 19572 



12 

NO INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT ; NO LASTING PEACE. 

That the lack of international government means international anarchy 
may be illustrated by som« recent events. Owing to the struggle of 
Serbia for expansion, Austria feared the seizure of its own territory and 
loss of some of its population, and so refused to accept mediation, because 
the Hapsburg monarchy being reported declining, she must counteract 
this impression by showing vigorous action. The success of Austria 
would be regarded by Russia as a threat to herself, but a defeat of 
Austria by Russia would be a defeat for Germany, and a German defeat 
for Russia and Prance would be regarded as a defeat for England. 
Thus the lack of any international government or organization made 
cooperation for peace almost, if not quite, impossible. England might 
have said to herself, among other reasons, " If I stay out of the war. 
Germany may overrun France and Belgium, resulting in a union of 
the French and German Navies, but we are an island, and it would 
not do to risk the danger of such a combination." 

Frontier questions have perhaps been the main cause of more wars 
in history than anything else. But in the course of events such ques- 
tions have come to he settled without resort to force, which is a change 
from national to international government. 

NATIONALISM MAY CONFLICT WITH THE PEOPLES' INTEREST. 

Another nationalistic anachronism is the geographical standard in 
governmental matters. But intercommunications are so many and so 
close that geographical relations have few reasons to be considered. 
Individual and racial interests are less geographical and more socio- 
logical. But governmental matters have not developed near so fast as 
sociological conditions. 

Nationalism more often represents the Interests of the few rather 
than the many. Unfortunately it is easy to bolster up a narrow and 
selfish nationalism by appeal to the patriotism of the masses who fail 
to understand the conditions and support the interests of a few against 
their own vital interests. While anarchy between nations (national- 
ism) makes future wars probable, anarchy within nations can be easily 
stopped by doing justice to the masses. 

WAR WORST METHOD OF SETTLING DIFFICDLTimS. 

An egotistical, selfish, and narrow nationalism, the basis of inter- 
national anarchy, has been demonstrated a partial, if not complete, 
failure by the condition in which Europe is to-day. War, though only 
one of many methods for settling difficulties between nations, has, 
nevertheless, been the main one. There is a strong desire among the 
people to substitute some other method. 

Generally a nation has two things to consider — one is what it wants ; 
the other whether it can enforce its wants. This is the usual na- 
tionalistic dilemma, but our demographic law of the interdependence 
of nations assumes that each country will respect the other countries 
and be willing to consider their wishes at least in vital matters. 

Where the differences between two nations have threatened the peace 
of Europe it has been felt that such a matter was more than a national 
question ; in fact, passed over into the international realm, and so 
conferences have been called which to a certain extent recognized the 
principle of interdependence and have enforced its decisions by blockade 
if not by more warlike means. If a nation adopt the methods of 
force, it is appealing to international anarchy, which causes nations 
to break international law much more readily than otherwise. In fact, 
military necessity knows no law. 

It may seem odd that conferences are so often called for war in- 
stead of for peace. But it is necessity that often rules ; the wheel In 
the machine is not examined until it is out of order, human beings 
were never studied scientifically until they became lunatics or crimi- 
nals. So peace seems to have been little thought of until danger 
of war appeared. Peace is like good health, we do not know its value 
until we lose it. 

SECRET DIPLOMACY INSIDIOUS. 

All treaties between nations should be published in order to make 
the diplomacy of intrigue and deception impossible or at least most 
difficult to carry into effect. Secret diplomacy enables those who want 
war to bring something to light suddenly and cause excitement and 
fear among the people and thus drive them into war before they under- 
stand what they are doing. The psychology of fear shows its power 
in producing apprehension by catch phrases, such as " the crisis is 
acute," or " there is panic on the stock exchange," or " negotiations 
may come to an end," or " an ultimatum has been sent." Patriotic 
as well as fear inspiring phrases are published broadcast leading the 
people into war, but they must always be made to believe that it is in 
defense of their country, whether it is or not. 
125746—19572 



13 

But open diplomacy anil international conforonccs prevent insidious 
methods of producina; excitement ; they also sive the people lime to 
thinlv and avoid precipitate action : also facts are brought to light that 
otherwise might have been concealed by those desiring war. 

COJIPETITIVE ARMAMENTS LEAD TO WAK. 

Competitive arman.ents, for which the masses are compelled to pay 
and by which they are liilled, hasten the probability of future wars. 
Great armaments lead to competitive armament, which experience shows 
to be no guaranty of peace, for it makes a nation feel so well pre- 
pared for war that when a dispute arises, and it is thought a tew 
days' delay may give the enemy an advantage that might never be 
regained, the enemv must be attacked at once. Thus Austria refused 
to extend time to Serbia nor would she take part in a conference of 
ambassadors nor respond to the Serbian note to refer the dispute to 
The Hague. So Germany retused a similar proposal to the ezar on 
July 29 and allowed Russia but 12 hours to answer the ultimatum. 
Russia had begun to mobilize and Germany's fear, if the proposal for 
pacific settlement were accepted, Russia would get the start and gain 
a military advantage probably caused Germany to strike at once. 
Thus such preparedness actually prevented any chance for even dis- 
cussion of a peaceful settlement. Also the knowledge that Russia s 
Army and Navy were to be increased and strategic railroads built and 
that" France was about to reintroduce three years' military service may 
have caused Germany to think it imprudent to delay an inevitable war 
any longer. 

PERMANENT PEACE HINDERED BY SPIRIT OF HATE. 

There can be no permanent peace so long as the idea of crushing this 
or that nation prevails. The question is not national, but interna- 
tional The nationalistic spirit of hate may be temporarily useful In 
stirring up a country to tight better, but it does not tend toward a 
lasting peace. In the stud.v of war we shou'd seek the causes, be im- 
personal, and neither condone nor accuse. The scientific investigation 
of war comes under the head of criminal anthropology, one of the pur- 
poses of which is bv knowledge gained to lessen or stop war per- 
manently rather than discuss the ethics of war involving the spirit of 
hate and vengeance. 

NO PERMANENT PEACE WITH NATIONALISM ALONE. 

The existing conditions between nations are somewhat like as if a 
State had rules and laws as to what to do when murder and riot occur, 
but no laws to prevent murder and riot, or, if there were laws, no power 
to execute them. 

From the theoretical point of view these irrational and abnormal 
conditions are evident, and yet they have been considered normal condi- 
tions for ages. This is indicated by the remark of a diplomat, who said : 
" Things are getting back to a wholesome state again, every nation for 
itself and God for us all." As long as such an extreme and pathological 
form of nationalism exists no permnnent peace is probable, if not impos- 
sible. Nationalism has had a long trial with comparative freedom, and 
one of its grand finale.s is the present European war. 

A FEW SUGGESTIONS FOR PERMANENT PEACE. 

It would go far beyond the purpose of this article to discuss the many 
methods proposed for establishing permanent peace, yet one may be 
allowed merely to note a few points. There might be established an 
international high court to decide judicial issues between independent 
sovereign nations and an international council to secure international 
legislation and to settle nonjudicial issues. Also, an international 
secretariat should be established. Some fundamental principles of such 
international control might be to disclaim all desire or intention of 
aggression, to pursue no claim against any other independent state ; not 
to send any ultimatum or threat of military or naval operations or do 
any act of aggression, and never to declare war or order any general 
mobilization or violate the territory or attack the ships of another state, 
except in way of repelling an attack actually made ; not to do any of 
these until the matter in dispute has been submitted to the interna- 
tional high court or to the international council, and not until a year 
after the date of such submission. 

PROHIBITIONS FOR RECALCITRANT STATES. 

In order to enforce the decrees of the international high court against 
any recalcitrant State an embargo on her ships and forbidding her land- 
ing at any capital might be initiated. Also there might be instituted 
prohibitioii of postal and telegraph communication, of payment of debts 
due to citizens, prohibition of all imports and exports and of all pas- 
senger traffic ; to level special duties on goods to such State and block- 
125746—19572 



14' 

ade her ports. In short, an effort should be made to enforce complete 
nonintercourse with any recalcitrant State. 

Should a State proceed to use force to go to war rather than obey the 
decree of the international high court all the other constituent States 
should nijike common cause against such State and enforce the order 
of the international high court. 

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT FOR PREVENTING WAR IS SOON AFTER WAR. 

If an absolute agreement among leading nations of the world never 
to resort to war could be obtained at the outset all other questions could 
be settled more justly and with fewer difficulties, for the consciousness 
that the supreme question was out of the way would relieve the psycho- 
logical tension and afford opportunity for a more calm and careful 
consideration and adjudication of all other matters in dispute. It 
would be like the consciousness of the lawyer, when having lost his case 
in all other courts is content to let the United States Supreme Court 
settle it forever. This is due to the psychologrical power of the radia- 
tion of justice from the top downward. 

Such an absolute and final agreement never to resort to war can be 
best accomplished right after the war, when all are sick of war and the 
very thought of it causes the suffering, wounded, and bleeding people 
to turn their heads significantly away with a profound instinctive feel- 
ing, crying ont that anything is better than to go back to the old 
regime." In such a state of mind mutual concessions are much easier 
to make than later on. 

The psychological moment to prevent such suffering of the ma.sses 
from ever occurring again is soon after the war. It is a sad comment 
that the number and untold suffering of millions of human beings seem 
to have been required for the nationalistic .spirit of Europe to be willing 
to follow international humanitarian ideas toward establishing perma- 
nent peace in the world. 

THE HAGUE RULES ONLY SUGGESTIONS. 

The diplomats who wrote the rules at The Hague Convention knew 
well that they might be more or less disregarded ; they were only sug- 
gestions. As" war assumes the right to kill human beings, what rights, 
then, have the victims left over that are worth mentioning? As to 
what way thev are killed there is little use of considering, probably the 
quicker the better, for there is less suffering. If prisoners must starve. 
It is a mercy to shoot them. To regulate murder of human beings is 
more or less" humbug. The thing to do is to try to abolish international 
anarchy and slaughter forever, and to accomplish this the egotism, sel- 
fishness, and narrowness of nations must be so modified that they are 
willing'to make the necessary sacrifice. 

If the reader believes the general ideas set forth in this study, let him 
or her aid the writer in a practical way and send a contribution to help 
circulate these ideas, not only in English and other languages but in 
other countries as well as the United States. 

The address of the author is : The Congressional, 100 East Capitol 
Street, Washington, D. C. 

EQUATION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC LAW OF INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS. 

As alreadv noted, our demographic law of the interdependence of na- 
tions is, that increase in the means of communication between States 
causes increase of their interdependence but decrease in their sov- 
ereignty. .Tust as a physical body consists of molecules of various 
kinds, "so the State may be regarded as a psychological entity with 
citizens of various characteristics, and just as the density of a body is 
equal to its mass divided by its volume, so the density of citizenship is 
equal to the population divided by the land nrea. _ 

If therefore, we consider the States' adult population, as its mass 
(m)'and the resultant aggregate increase of its means of communica- 
tion as its velocity (v), and (t) as the time, then the psychological force 
(PI or interdependence of the State can be expressed by the familiar 
enuation in physics F=mv/t ; that is to say, the interdependence of a 
State is equal to its adult population (mass) multiplied by the re- 
sultant aggregate increase of its means of communication (velocity) 
and the product divided by the time (t). 

The poundaJ unit of physical force is such a force as will move 1 
pound (mass unit) at a velocity of 1 foot per second m one second of 

*^'™Nbw assuming the unit of citizenship of a State to be one citizen 
and the unit of the resultant aggregate increase of means of communi- 
tion per annum in one year of time to be K, then •„ • „ „„„ 

Tlio statal unit of psychological force is such a force as will give one 
citizen (mass unit) one K unit (for convenience the K unit of annual 
nggregate increase of means of communication can be expressed m per 
125746—19572 



15 

cents. Taking some of the principal means of communication, and 
working out their annual average per cents of increase, we have for the 
United States during the census periods (1900-1910) ; annual average 
increase of passengers on railroads, 7 per cent ; on street and electric 
railways, 3 per cent (1907-1912) ; of telegraph messages sent, 6 per 
cent ; of telephone stations, 10 per cent. Combining these, the per cent 
of annual average aggregate increase will be 6.5 per cent, as value of K, 
assuming the percentages are equally weighted) of resultant aggregate 
increase of means of i^ommunication per annum in one year of time. 

As yet there is no exact way to measure the sovereignty and means of 
communication of the State, but the psychological side of this physical 
equation may suggest a working hypothesis for our demographic law of 
the interdependence of States which may some time be useful in the 
realm of international psychology. 

To measure the aggregate influence upon citizens of the many means 
of communication in a State (also, for illustration merely, let us take 
one of the principal means of communication, as steam railroads, and 
we find that the annual average increase in passenger-train-car miles 
for one citizen of the United States, from 1908 to 1914, to be 4.45, 
which is the value of K for steam railroads alone for period mentioned. 
In a later article the author will consider in detail the practical ap- 
plication of the equation) as steam, street and electric railways, tele- 
graph and telephones, will require exact detailed knowledge of the 
mental, moral, and physical power of the individual citizen, the unit of 
the social organism. Such measurements might be made when psy- 
chologv and sociology become sciences in the rigid sense. The under- 
lying hypothesis in this equation is that both the psychological and 
physical mechanism of the world are under one fundamental law.^ 

Laws of Revoldtion.'' 

Scientific history teaches that without war many revolutions could 
never have taken place. One of the greatest problems of future gov- 
ernment is to reconcile democratic equality with hereditary inequality 
among the people. Governments differ much more in form than in sub- 
stance, and make progress when the resultant activities of the citizens 
direct and control them. 

With this in mind, a few principles of revolutions may be instructive 
in connection with the present European situation. ^ 

1. The causes of revolutions are summed up in the word " discontent,' 
which must be general and accompanied with hope in order to produce 
results. . ^ ^ 

2. Modern revolutions appear to be more abrupt than ancient. Con- 
trary to expectation, conservative people may have the most violent 
revolutions, because of not being able to adapt themselves to changes 
of environment. 

3. Revolution owes its power to the unchaining of the people, and does 
not take place without the aid of an important fraction of the army, 
which usually becomes disaffected by power of suggestion. 

4. The triumphant party will organize according to whether the revo- 
lution is effected by soldiers, radicals, or conservatives. . 

5. The violence is liable to be great if a belief as well as material 
interests are being defended. 

6. For ideas which cause violent contradictions are matters of faith, 
rather than of knowledge. 

7. If the triumphant party go to extremes, bordering upon absurdi- 
ties, they are liable to be turned down by the people. 

8. Most revolutions aim to put a new person in power, who usually 
tries to establish an equilibrium between the struggling factions, and 
not be too much dominated by any one class. 

9 The rapidity of modern revolutions is explained by quick methods 
of publicity, aijd the slight resistance and ease with which some gov- 
ernments have been overturned is surprising, indicating blind confi- 
dence and inability to foresee. 

10. Governments sometimes have fallen so easily that they are saic 
to have committed suicide. . 

11. Revolutionary organizations are impulsive, though often timid, 
and are influenced bv a few leaders, who may cause them to act con- 
trary to the wishes of the majority. Thus ro yal assemblies have 

1 See article (by author) entitled "Anthropology of Modern Civilized 
Man " in Medical Fortnightly and Laboratory News, St. Louis, Mo., 
April 1919 ; also chapter on " Emil Zola " in Senate Document (by 
author) No. 532. Sixtieth Congress, first session. „ , ,, , 

3 Article (by writer) in Journal of Education, Boston, Mass., for 
December 26, 1918. 
125746—19572 



16 



..• 



LIBKHKY Uh UUNOKbbb 



021 140 204 # 



destroyed empires and humanitarian legislatures have permitted 
massacres. 

12. When all social restraints are abandoned, and instinctive im- 
pulses are allowed full sway, there is danger of return to barbarlanism. 
For the ancestral ego (inherent in everyone) is let loose. 

13. A country will prosper in proportion that the really superior 
persons rule, and this superiority is both moral and mental. 

14. If certain social tendencies appear to lower the power of mind, 
they, nevertiieless, may lessen injustice to the weaker classes ; and if it 
be a choice between mentality and morality, morality should be pre- 
ferred. 

15. A financial aristocracy does not promote much jealousy in those 
who hope to form a part of it in the future. 

16. Science has caused many things once held to be historical to be 
now considered doubtful. Thus it is asked — 

17. Would not the results of the French Revolution, which cost so 
much bloodshed, have been obtained without violence later, through 
gradual evolution ? And were the results of the French Revolution 
worth the cost of the terrible barbarism and suffering that took place? 

18. To understand the people in a revolution we must know their 
history. 

19. The accumulated thought, feeling, and tradition of a nation con- 
stitute its strength, which is its national spirit. This must not be too 
rigid, nor too malleable. For, in the first place, revolution means 
anarchy, and, in the second place, it results in successive revolutions. 



War and Peace Studies. 
By the Author. 

Peace, War, and Humanity. I'rinted by Judd & Detweiler, Washing- 
ton, D. C, 26 pages, 1915, 8°. 

Comparative Militarism. Reprint from publications of the American 
Statistical Association, Boston, December, 1915, 3 pages, 8°. 

Atrocities and Outrages of War. Reprint from the Pacific Medical 
.Journal, San Francisco, April, 1916, 16 pages, 8°. Gives data for Civil 
War, Boer War, Bulgaria, and Russia and Germany, 16 pages, 8°. 

Some Moral Evils of War. Reprint from Pacific Medical Journal, 
San Francisco, August, 1916, 8 pages, 8°. Refers especially to Boer 
War. 

Reasons for Peace. Machinists' Monthly Journal, Washington, D. C, 
July, 1916, pages 708-710, 8°. 

Choosing Between War and Peace. Reprint from Western Medical 
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Statement of European War. Reprint from Pacific Medical Journal, 
San Francisco, Calif., February. 1917, 8 pages. 8°. 

Prevention of War. Reprint from Congressional Record, Wash- 
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Military Training in the Public Schools. Educational Exchange, Bir- 
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War and Criminal .Vnthropology. Published in the Congressiopal 
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Our National Defense. Testimony of American officers as to diffi- 
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Identification of Soldiers After Death and Head Measurements. Bos- 
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pages, 8°. 

Revolutions. Journal of Education, Boston, Mass., December 26, 
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Anthropometry of Soldiers. Medical Record, New York City, De- 
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Psychology of Swiss Soldiers. Arms and the Man, Washington, D. C, 
1918 ; also, in Journal of Medicine and Surgery, Nashville, Tenn., 
March, 1919. 

International Psychology and Peace. Chicago Legal News, May 1, 1919. 

Suggestions of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia for the Peace Con- 
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1919; also, in Open Court, April, 1919; also (in German) Milwaukee 
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" Rivista d'lalia," Milano. April. 1919. 

Disequilibrium of Mind and Nerves in War. Medical Record, New 
York City. May 3. 1919 ; also, reprint, 12 pages, 12°. 
125746 — 10572 



o 



.iiiiiii 

021 140 204 I 



HoUinger 

pH8.5 

Mill Run F3-1955 




021 140 204 



HoUinger 

pH8.5 

Mill Run F3.1955 



